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Mr. Wallace, it has caused the loss of precious time since the work passed under the control of the United States. With abundant financial resources and unlimited time for construction, it may be considered 'feasible' from an engineering point of view to construct a sea-level canal, but when completed it must always remain inferior as a transit route, to the lake-type adopted."

Students of the canal project in its historical, political, economic and technical aspects will find General Abbot's work one that it would be well to read in connection with the more comprehensive and complete discussion contained in the "Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for 1899-1901" and in the "Report of the Board of Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal, 1906." These two official reports are accompanied with numerous maps and charts which greatly enhance their value.

EMORY R. JOHNSON.

University of Pennsylvania.

Alexander, E. P. *Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative.*

Pp. xviii, 634. Price, \$4.00. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907.

To a layman this book appeals as little short of epoch making in the history of military criticism. It gives detailed accounts of the battles and movements of the Army of Northern Virginia and of the battle of Chickamauga, in which the author, a brigadier-general in the Confederate army and chief of artillery, took part. He lays down the chessboard, places his men, and points out the moves that were made and should have been made with such consummate skill that one is strongly tempted to follow him in every detail. This, too, in a game of war when the movement for peace is so strong.

One of the most striking features of the book is its entire freedom from animus or partisan bias. It is very pleasing indeed to find an old soldier who, if he ever carried in his heart any of the bitterness of defeat, has lost it all and can now review the struggle as he might review the battle of Waterloo or the siege and storming of Port Arthur. If criticisms are meted out to all—and scarcely a man on either side escapes—it is not because of a desire to be impartial in their distribution, but because the author can see mistakes and has the courage to point them out.

The same man is not always at fault. If Stonewall Jackson is under a "spell" in the seven days' fighting, that does not dim the luster of his valley campaign and the masterful strategy of the second Manassas. If McClellan was a poor fighter, he was a splendid organizer. Perhaps Pope's general incapacity is hardly to be offset by the fact that he was a past master at boasting. The faults, as well as the virtues, of Longstreet are freely pointed out. He hardly suffers as much at the author's hands in the Gettysburg campaign as he has at the hands of others. On the whole, the author concludes that the loss of the battle, if any other result was ever possible, was mainly the fault of Lee, not because Lee took the blame on himself, but because a study of the battle has revealed his errors, mistakes which "he himself would have [pointed out] had he lived to write

his own memoirs. No more intimate idea can be gained of his personal character than can be had from a study of his attitude upon such occasions. . . . Surely there never lived a man who could more truly say:

'I am the master of my fate,
I am the captain of my soul.'

DAVID Y. THOMAS.

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von Bernhardt, F. W. *Cavalry in Future Wars.* Pp. xxviii, 305. Price, \$3.00. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1906.

The commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army has given us a timely contribution to army literature. The work is prepared with especial reference to the conditions in the German forces.

It is almost needless to say, however, that the use to be made of cavalry, or any other arm of the service, is so affected by surrounding conditions that rules cannot be laid down that will be equally applicable to one place as to another. The book must, therefore, be read with discrimination and judgment. The cavalry of the future will always have a most important part to play in war, and while "shock tactics," or the use of cold steel in battle, may under some conditions, be justifiable, it will be so only against other cavalry or the most disordered infantry. The range, accuracy and volume of fire of the modern rifle has given to good infantry a confidence and steadiness that cavalry cannot disregard. The important functions of cavalry in keeping the commanding general advised of the strength and movements of the enemy are more important now than ever. When the commanding general has reliable information on these points his task is comparatively easy.

This is the age of specialists, and it is scarcely to be expected that the ordinary man, who forms the bulk of an army, can be made proficient in the use of the saber or lance, and also become a good marksman with a rifle. It takes time to make a good infantry soldier, it takes longer to make a good cavalryman. The importance of a cavalry leader is dwelt on at considerable length, but cavalry leaders are not made to order. Great cavalry leaders, like great generals, are born, not manufactured. That army is lucky that possesses one.

The need of a well-organized, well-equipped and well-drilled cavalry, particularly in the first days of a war, is recognized as of the utmost importance, and the lack of it is nowhere more keenly felt than in Europe. But it is necessary to use the branch carefully and not expect too much from it, for its losses cannot be readily replaced. The author of the work is an experienced cavalryman, and eminent in his profession. His views are entitled to more than ordinary consideration, even though in all his conclusions we may not concur. Perhaps there is no other German soldier so well equipped for handling this subject.

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